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PETITION OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS FOR REHEARING
COME NOW respondents-defendants and petition this
:ionorable court for rehearing of this appeal from judgment of
,~,e Third Judicial District Court,

Judge.
in

the Honorable Dean E. Conder,

This petition is based upon the following points of error

the ruling by the majority of the court in its written opinion

filed May 5, 1978:
POINT I.
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON
ISSUE OF STANDING DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES THE RULES PROMULGATED
AND THE LAW AS DECREED BY THE COURT IN THAT IT CONTRADICTS
THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF RULE 56(e) AND TURNS UPON REPRESENTATIONS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
POINT II.
BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COURT APPELLANT CANNOT TRACE THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
BACK TO A COMMON GRANTOR AND THEREFORE APPELLANT HAS NO
ST.ll.NDING TO ENFORCE SUCH A COVENANT.
POINT III.
EVEN ASSUMING SATISFACTION OF THE DOCTRINF
OF HAYES V. GIBBS APPELLANT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED
BY THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AND THEREFORE LACKS STANDING TO
ENFORCE IT.
POINT IV.
COUNSEL REQUESTS CLJ>.RIFICATION AS TO WHETHER
ON REMAND SUMKl\.RY JUDGMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF ADDITIONAL
UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATED THAT APPELLANT LACKS STANDING
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF HAYES V. GIBBS.
Dated this 25th da7 of .May, 1978.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action alleging violation of a restrictive
co·;enant applicable to real property and seeking alternatively
injunctive relief and damages.

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL FOLLOWING PRIOR HEARING
This appeal was taken from a decision of the Third Judicial
Di.strict Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dean E. Conder
presiding, granting defendants-respondents' motion for summary
judgment on the separate grounds that ( 1) plaintiff-appellant lacks
standing to sue for the enforcement of the subject restrictive
~~nant,

and (2)

plaintiff-appellant is barred from suing to

enforce the subject restrictive covenants by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The appeal was argued orally to this honorable court on
April 12, 19-8.

On

~lay

5, 1978 the court filed a written opinion,

per Justice Hall and concurred in by Justices Crockett and Maughan,
(a copy of which is attached hereto) reversing the decision of the
~ial court and remanding the case for further proceedings not

~consistent with the opinion of the court.

Chief Justice Ellett

wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justice Wilkins.
It is with respect to the court's ruling on the issue of
swnding to which defendants-respondents seek rehearing before the
court for the reasons stated herein.

-1-
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POINT I
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON THE IS , .
STANDING DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES THE RULES PROMULGATE~UE ~'
LAW AS DECREED BY THE COURT IN THAT IT CONTRADICTS ~ANu-·
LANGUAGE OF RULE 5 6 ( e) AND TURNS UPON REPRESENTATIO~;~E c·
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
~'.I•::
The opinion of the majority on the issue of standir::
based upon the summary judgment requirements of Rule 56, Utat:
of Civil Procedure, declaring that there remains as

tot~~
".•·

of standing an issue of material fact which precludes S\JJlUl\ari·
judgment determination. However, in so ruling the majority d::
contradicts Rule 56 and relies upon oral and written represe:.tations made by counsel for appellant which are totally wit::::·
support in the entire record, and certainly devoid of
support expressly required by Rule 56 (e).

t~ ~~

Without such rellr

and therefore because of the error of such reliance, the op1:.:·
the majority cannot stand.
This issue of standing as briefed and argued to t:.E
by both parties is governed by the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, i:
U.54, 169 P.2d 781

(1946). Basically, this case requires tr.r

one to have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant whic:
part of general scheme for building and development, one mus:
able to trace the covenant back to a common grantor.
783-786.

16 9 p :

This interpretation of Hayes v. Gibbs is adopted:

majority opinion (Opinion p. 2).

consequently the issue o:

ing turns upon whether the appellant can trace the restric:.
a com.mo:.
covenant encumbering respondents' property bac k t 0
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In reference to this issue, the majority opinion makes
several determinative declarations.

In its recitation of the

"basic facts presented" the majority states:
"[T)he litigants are the owners of adjacent lots in
Northcrest Subdivision which share a common boundary, although
one lot is in Plat "E" and the other in Plat "F" of said
subdivision; the two plats were developed by separate corporate entities hence the lots in question were ostensibly not
acquired from a common granter, however [Appellant] maintains
that both corporations were wholly owned by one James B.
cunninghaJn; the lots in both plats aresubject to the same
restrictive covenants as to structure height, they merely
having been imposed by different developers;
"
(emphasis
added).
(Opinion p. l).
The majority then concludes that as to this issue of
whether there is a common granter there remains a question of fact,
stating:
"The issue of standing raised in the pleadings is one of
material fact which precludes that the---eritry of summary
judgment ...
[Appellant) contends he and [Respondents] did derive
their titles from ~ common granter since the corporate
developers were in fact one and the same."
(emphasis added).
(Opinion p. 2):- - - --- - These pivotal contentions by appellant emphasized above
~d relied upon by the majority to create the swnmary judgment

defeating "issue of material fact" are not the product of the
record, but rather are entirely founded upon written and oral
representations of appellant's counsel on appeal.
The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure as
stated by this court in Dupler v. Yeates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624
:l 96 0) "is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show that
:".ere is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may
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be raised in the pleadings, and that the moving part'' i

.1
s e:::~:_
to judgment as a matter of law.'' 351 P.2d at 636 (emphasis J'.'

Prior to the 1965 amendment to Rule 56 (e) there''"

-..

question as to whether allegations in pleadings were alone s·.:'
to create issues of fact when opposed by affidavits. See C:.r.·

--...::.:..:

v. Financial Service Co., 14 U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (19 631 .
However, the 1965 amendment removed all doubt.

Rule 56(e) :,o.

requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to:::,
forward with admissible evidence in the form of affidavit er
deposition, or suffer the consequences. Rule 56 (e) now reaC:s.
part:
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and su::
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest·~
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but r.1s
response by affidavitsor as otherwISe provided in thu~
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a,::..
issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, SUJ1U11ary-j~;c,
i f approprrate";° shall be -entered" against him. "("effiph~
added) .

--- -

Any question of whether the vestiges of Christense:
supra remained following the amendment was expressly disposes'
this court in United American Life Insurance Company v.
U.2d 279, 444 P.2d 755

w:L'

(1968) wherein a party attemptedt 0

"·

upon Christensen contending that mere allegations were suffi:.
The court met such a contention with the following reply:
. t 13·· I
"When that case [Christensen] was decided, 1 P· :'.
all by itself among the states of the Nation, and tn~ '.:::
associate it had in that regard was the Third Fe~er~ ,::
1
(Citation omitted)
Quite aside frora having the ais; :;
causing Utah to be the only soldier in the :1at1on t",:·
step " the case is now no authority :'or t::ie clai:n ;:~-:
0
appellants for the reason that Rule 56 (e) ·t1as 3 me~,~=
•
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the addition of the following language
~hen quotes Rules 56 (e).

i-,,

The majority's assertion that the issue of
~
e~.trv

(the court
standing~

in the pleadings is one of material fact which precludes the
of summary judgment not only abrogates the 1965 amendment to

:<ule 56 (e), but also relegates Utah to become once again "the only
~ldier i~
J~n

the nation to be in step."

Additionally, the reliance

gratuitous and totally unsupported statements by counsel to

the effect that the two corporate developers were both wholly owned
by )Ir. Cunningham and were one in the same directly contravenes
~le

56(e).

If appellant has any shread of evidence to support

these claims the time to come forward has long since passed.

To

allow such unsupported assertions to form the basis of the majority's
remand of this case to the trial court makes a shambles of the
letter and spirit of Rule 56 (e) and the remand should not be allowed
to stand.

POINT II
BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT APPELLANT
CANNOT TR.~CE THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT BACK TO A COMMON GRANTOR
~~D THEREFORE APPELLANT HAS NO STANDING TO ENFORCE SUCH A
COVENANT.
As acknowledged by the majority opinion, the doctrine of
Ha:ies v. Gibbs, supra, requires that appellant be able to trace the
~strictive covenant which he

:ommor: gr an tor.

is seeking to enforce back to a

ropinion p.2).

Also as stated by the majority

:;~~nion there is os':ensibly no common grantor, appellant having
~c=u~red h:"'

l ·Y':

irJm 'lorthcrest ~1anor and respondents having
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acquired their lot from Northcrest Investment.

The only e'/;'

before the lower court on this issue, and therefore

before : .

court, consists of testimony by one James B. Cunningham,.

wn .. c-

contained within two affidavits; one in support of the mot::·
summary judgment and one in opposition thereto.

These af::::

state in their entirety as follows:
"JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath, hereby deposes :~
states:

1. . I am the president of the Northcrest Investme::
Corporation, the developer of Plat "F" of the Northcw:
Subdivision.
I have been president of this corporati:r. 1
the date of its incorporation.
2.
That neither the Northcrest Investment Corpor::.
nor myselrPersonally participated and/or owned an inte:;
the development of Plat "E" of the NorthcrestSubdi~
3.
When Northcrest Investment Corporation acquire:
prr_ipertv Idei1tified as Northcrest Subdivision, Plat'"f":i
was no restrictive covenant encumbering the property~~
4.
!_ made the attached restrictive covenants~
to the lots in Plat "F" Northcrest Subdivision, togeb:'
the buyers o fsuch lots, by recording the same in the:':
of the Salt Lake County Recorder on or about August 21, ·
5.
The primary purpose and intent of the height r::
tions contained within the attached covenant is to ~race'
view of the Salt Lake Valley for those lots in Plat 'T' ·i1
uphill side of property subject to the restr1ct1ons. '
added).
•

•

II

"JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath hereby deposes:::
states:

f;-j

1.
Phenix Investment Inc. purchased all of th~
Northcrest Manor Inc., ~ had developed Pla\ ~ ~
Subdivision, and then dissolved the Northcrest ~"'"
and brought all of its land into Phenix Investme~ --+:.
land investment company, which then transferred ~:;:;;
Northcrest Investment Co. ---ofWhich I am President.

Q

-

------

2.
It was through Northcrest Investment co.
continued development of Northcrest Subd1v1sion
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purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor, I continued the
development of the area maintaining the same name for the
~ubdivision and filing restrictive covenants like those filed
~or the portion of the Subdivision already developed." (emphasis
added).
It is admitted that appellant's lot is in Plat "E" which
~s

developed by Northcrest Manor and that respondent's lot is in

Plat "F" which was developed by Northcrest Investment.

Thus, once

again, the critical issue before the court is whether Northcrest
Manor, Inc. and Northcrest Investment were one and the same corporation wholly owned by James Cunningham.

The only evidence before

:he court is that neither Mr. Cunningham nor Northcrest Investment

corporation participated in and/or owned any interest in the develO?ment of Plat "E", and therefore no interest in Northcrest Manor
at the critical point in time when Plat "E" was developed.
Following acquisition by Phenix Investment, Inc. of the
Northcrest Manor stock and the immediate dissolution of Northcrest
Hanor (which made the purchase of the stock of Northcrest Manor
tantamount to the outright purchase of the assets of Northcrest
:1anor) the land in Plat "F" was ultimately deeded to Northcrest
Investment.

This letter of conveyance of Plat "F" was not encumbered

by any restrictive covenant, thereby making impossible any chain of
covenant back to Northcrest Manor.
Under these undisputed facts there is no manner or means
by Which appellant can argue that the test of Hayes v.

Gibbs has

~en met. All interest and ownership in Plat "F" was circuitously
~ransferred from ;Jorthcrest Manor to Northcrest Investment without
- "

2

ncun1br,,r>:ci0 rf restrictive covenant.
-- "''c

re

t-t1e •..;,l_·

This break in the chain

granter common to both appellant and
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respondent, i.e. Northcrest Manor, breaks the enforc

b .
ea ilit1:.

covenant and thereby deprives appellant of any standing~~
the covenant.
POINT III
EVEN ASSUMING SATISFACTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HAYES V ..
APPELLANT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED BY THE RES~;:'.
COVENANT AND THEREFORE LACKS STANDING TO ENFORCE IT ....
The restrictive covenant in question provides in r::
part:

"THAT, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT CORPORATION
the ~ of Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F", situate~.
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and it desires and inte::
1
sell and convey th~ same to purchas~rs for the purposes :,
1
con temp lated, and in order to restrict the use of said :::t
and thereby enhance the value thereof, it hereby agrees.•.
all who shall purchase said property, orany part ther:o:
that in consideration orsilch purchase and use thereof,,
property shall be and is restricted in the following res:''
to wit;
USE OF LAND:
Each lot in said subdivision is heret,
designated as a residential lot, and none of the said:::
shall be improved, used or occupied for other than priva:
single family residence and no structure shall be er~~
placed on any of said lots other than a one, two or th:o::
garage not exceeding one story in height, and one single
family dwelling not to exceed one story in height; exce::
that on those lots where the finished ground elevatior, ::
least one story lower on one side of the dwelling than c:I
opposite side, the dwelling may extend two stories ab01·e:
finished ground elevation on such lower surface . · · anc:
owner or owners of any of the lots in said subdivisio~,'::1
have the right to sue for and obtain an injunction pru ....
or mandatory to prevent the breach of or to enfo~ce t~'.,'.
servance of the restrictions above set forth · · ·
(e ...,.
added).
·
'
·
d testi· mony of James
According
to tne
un d ispute

cu::J
" ... 1

he, on behalf of Nor there st Investment, made this covenanc ,,.
to Plat "F" for the "primary purpose and intent" of presec::
view of the Salt Lake Valley "for those lots in

-8-
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:_:: ·

uohill ~ of the property subject to the restriction."

It is

:...>---

ad;;:itted by the appellant that his lot is not in Plat "F" and that
:us let is below, or on the downhill side, of respondents' lot.
In construing the provisions of a restrictive covenant
suc1' as the one quoted above it is important to keep two rules of
~nstruction

in mind.

First, whether or not a restrictive covenant

dpplies to iand is a matter of the intent on the part of the one
who imposes the restrictions.
2d, covenants, etc., Sec.

See, e.g. Hayes v. Gibbs, 20 Am.Jur.

292; see also annotation in 89 A.L.R. at

page 812. Secondly, in construing any ambiguous terms in a restric:tl

'1

tive covenant all doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of the property.

These two rules of construction

were combined by this court in Parrish v. Richards, 8 V. 2d 419, 3 3 6
P.2d 122 (1959) wherein it was stated:

"[I]n the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions the courts will resolve all doubts in favor of the free
and unrestricted use of property, and that it will have recourse to every aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain the intention of the parties."
Id. at 336 P.2d 122.
Applying these rules of construction it is apparent that
appellant was not intended by the granter to be benefitted by the
covenant.

Clearly, the fact that appellant's lot is below respon-

~nts' makes the height restriction protecting the view of Salt
Lake Valley inapplicable.

As to the question of whether the enforce-

:nent provisions apply to all owners of lots in the Northcrest
Subdivision or just to those in Plat "F" there appears some ambig'Ji':~· on t:ie face of the covenant.

However, given the stated in-

:e'."l:iJr: cf the :;:-a.n':'Jr to benefit "those lots in Plat "F", and the

-9-
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presumption favoring the free and unrestricted use of p
roper:
again must conclude that appellant was not intended to b ,
e ce~.:
by this covenant and, therefore, that he has no standing,
Importantly, with respect to both the intent

of~

Cunningham and the restrictive covenant applicable to Plat,,,
appellant failed at the trial court to create an issue of iac:
The undisputed facts fully support the trial court's granting:
summary judgment for lack of standing.
POINT IV

COUNSEL REQUESTS CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER ON REMAND:,
JUDGMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED nc:.'
DEMONSTRATED THAT APPELLANT LACKS STANDING UNDER THE CCC:;
OF HAYES V. GIBBS.
Counsel is somewhat at a loss as to how it should ::1
with the following inquiry.

The majority opinion reverses ac:

remands due to remaining questions of fact relating to
v. Gibbs issue of standing.

However,

the~

in so doing the majorit:

states that this issue of standing itself "as raised in the::
ings is one of material fact which precludes the entry of sir:judgment."
If this court rejects the positions set forth in ?c::
hereof respondents find themselves in a position of ~v~g~
tional undisputable facts regarding the Hayes v. Gibbs issue
standing but facing a declaration that under no circumstance:
the issue of standing be determined on summary judgment. Pe:
this quandry depicts the rationale behind the amendment tc ' .. '
(e)

(see Point I)

but nevertheless leaves respondents -,,·i:',
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prospe ct of discovery and trial on the merits when under undisputed
facts appellant has no standing.
counsel for respondent respectfully requests that the
Nurt answer the question as to whether, given undisputed facts
which would demonstrate appellant's lack of standing under the
doctrine of Hayes v. Gibbs, summary judgment could be again granted
by the lower court.

Respectfully Submitted this 25th day of May, 1978.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 1978, postage

prepaid, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Nann Novinski-Durando

Jta.;:
0UJ4\tl)) a '(1/iCfik,

at 431 South 300 East, Suite 210, Sal~ ~ke City,

84111.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----00000-----

Fiero G. R uffinengo,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No. 15348

v.

FILED
Robert F. and Nancy H. Miller,
The Art Company, J. Blair Jones,
John Does 1 through 20,
Defendants and Respondents.

May 5, 1978

Geoffrey J, Butlet,

HALL, Justice:

I

Plaintiff {hereinafter "R uffinengo 11 ) appeals from a summary jud~~
dismissing his suit to enjoin the construction of a house by defendants
(hereinafter "Miller") alleged to be in violation of a restrictive covenat'. l
prohibiting the construction of dwellings in excess of two stories.
.

f

The basic facts presented to the trial court are as follows: the
litigants are the owners of adjacent lots in Northcrest Subdivision whici
share a common boundary, although one lot is in Plat "E" and the other
in Plat "F" of said sub di vision; the two plats were developed by sepam
corporate entities hence the lots in question were ostensibly not acquire'
from a common granter, how ever, R uffinengo maintains that both corpo:l
were wholly owned by one James B. Cunningham; the lots in both platsa:
subject to the same restrictive covenants as to structure height, theym·
having been imposed by different developers; the covenants specifically
provide for enforcement by any "owner or owners of any of the lots ins<.
subdivision; 11 prior to the filing of the instant case, :tvliller had successf'jc
defended a nearly identical lawsuit brought by two other lot owners inthel<
subdivision wherein it was determined that the dwelling was not in violi:
of the covenants.
Ji
The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Rufiinengo~i·
no standing to maintain the action since his granter was not comrnonto
and that he was further barred by the doctrine of collateral estop~els~
issue presented had already been determined in the prior proceeding."
contends the trial court erred in so doing, and we agree.
. proper on 1y i"f t h e pea
l d'ings, depositions,
Summary Judgment is
.. , .. ~
•
.
.
.
.
llh tne •· :
answers to 1nterrogator1es, and adm1ss1ons on file, together w
,
· l fa cr :ic' •
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any matena
· ..
l Ifthere:'·
movina art is entitled to a ·udament as a matter of law.
r:
10
"
.
.
'
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. . e as to any material fact, summary judgment should be denied. Z
;nuine is su
The issue of standing raised in the pleadings is one of material
. h recludes the entry of summary judgment. The covenant in
ictwhic. pfound in the chain of title of all lots in the subdivision and
cest1on J.S
to allow enforcement by any and all lot owners.
crpor t s

Ruffinengo contends he and Miller did derive their titles from a
rantor since the corporate developers were in fact one and the
1mmon g
t has long been established that if a general scheme for building
I
1me.
. •
rdevelopment is intended by the original grantor, subsequent grantees
iay bring action against each other to enforce restrictive covenants, and
b intent may be shown by the acts of the grantor and the attendant ·
~cumstances. 3 It necessarily follows that R uffinengo should be afforded
je opportunity to make such a showing by presenting his evidence.

As to the matter of collateral estoppel, it is to be noted
'1ffinengo was not a party nor in privity with a party in the prior suit
!ainst Miller. Consequently, he cannot be bound by that proceeding.
1
\llateral estoppel is not a defense as against a litigant who was not
"party to the action and judgment claimed to have created an estoppel. 4
The proposition was clearly stated in Blonder-Tongue v. University
flllinois Foundations as follows:
Some litigants -- those who never appeared in a
prior action -- may not be collaterally estopped without
litigating the issue. They never had a chance to present
their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process
prohibits estopping them despite one or more adjudications
of the identical is sue which stand squarely against their
position.

o:l

1
:

It is also to be noted that if the doctrine should be applied to these
constitutional right to appeal
)cause he was not a party to the prior suit •

;ts that Ruffinengo would be denied his
..

Miller's contention that if Ruffinengo is not estopped all oth~; lot
}ners could also sue and that the burden of litigation and accompanying
1
· et1s
e wou ld be enormous, has no real merit for he needed only resort
6
ule 19 (a) to protect against such eventualities. The rule reads in
as follows:
.
Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862 (1952).
, Hayes, et al. v. Gibbs, et al., JlO Utah 54, 169 P. 2d 781 (1946), dting
Qr~"· Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490, 85 N. E. 687 (1908).
Jm~r:nen
Sla 1ens, Utah, 546 P. 2d 601 (1976);· Halling v. Industrial
4·;~, ~''1_n ol Utah, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 (1927) •
. u::;u,:., 313. 91 S. Ct. 1434, 28 L. Ed.2d 788 (1971).
1 ·-a Rules Civil
Procedure.
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• •• persons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should
join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his consent
cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant or
in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
'
Miller's further contention that Ruffinengo was "in privit " 5 . •
because he had an identical right to his neighbor's that was pre·y·
u::,.
11ousl"
1
adjudicated is not persuasive. This is so for two basic reasons:
(1) It is not at all unforseeable that R uffinengo might
reach a different result than did the other lot owners in
the prior suit, simply because he may present a far
different or convincing case.

(Z) This court has a consistent policy of resolving
doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in
court on the merits of the controversy. 7
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not
with this opinion.

inconsiste~t

WE CONCUR:

IC

J. Allan Crockett, Justice

Richard J. Maughan, Justice
ELLETT, Chief Justice:

(Concurring in part and dissenting)

The question presented by this appeal is this: can -an owner of\.i::
adjoining land subject to restrictive covenants enforce ~ose restrictic~
The plaintiff owns land in Plat E which was owned and developec_.
by Northcrest Manor, Inc.. Phenix Investment, Inc., another corpor•·
fer-•d ce~
purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor and therea f ter t rans '" i: ..
a 'ion ca;;:.
land previously owned by Northcrest Manor, Inc. to a corpor '.
. 'd d it as
Northcrest Investment which d_eveloped the land and subd l\T1 e
..
"Northcrest Subdivision, Plat F." In connection with the developme~
then owner filed a document in the office of the County Recorder of··
~w~h~1~·c~h::_s~o~f~a::!.r~a~s_m:!;;a::..:_te::..:,r~ia::.:,l~h~e:..:_r~e~t~o:_:.r~e~a~d~s~·~·~~~~~~~~~~~-----7. Carmen v. Slavens, supra, footnote 4.
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KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS;

TH.A..T, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, is the owner of Northcrest Subdivision,
Plat "F", situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
it desires and intends to sell and convey the same to
'
purchasers for the purposes herein contemplated, and in
order to restrict the use of said property and theFeby
enhance the value thereof, it hereby agrees with all who
shall purchase said property, or any part thereof, that
i;i consideration of such purchase and use thereof, said
property shall be and is restricted in the following respects,
to wit:
USE OF LAND: Each lot in said subdivision is hereby
designated as a residential lot, and none of the said lots
shall be improved, used or occupied for other than private,
single family residence purposes, and no flat or apartment
house shall be erected thereon, and no structure shall be
erected or placed on any of said lots other than a one, two
or three car garage not exceeding one story in height, and
one single family dwelling not to exceed one story in height;
The plaintiff owns no land in Plat F but does own a lot in Plat E
1hicn abuts against the defendants' land in Plat F.
One James B. Cunningham made an affidavit which was filed with
he trial court. 'l;:he contents thereof were not disputed. The affidavit is
~follows:

JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath, hereby deposes
and states:

1. I am the president of the Northcrest Investment
Corporation,- the developer of Plat "F" of the Northcrest
Subdivision. I have been president of this corporation
since the date of its incorporation.
2. That neither the Northcrest Investment Corporation
nor myself personally participated and/or owned an interest
in the development of Plat "E" of the Northcrest Subdivision.
3. When Northcrest Investment Corporation acquired
the property identified as Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F"
there was no res t nc
· ti ve covenant
·
the property.
encumbering
4
.
T m 0L:e the attached restrictive covenants applicable
:~ '~"' kts '';-=ht "F" Northcrest Subdivision, together with
0 of s·1ch lots, by recordincr the same in the Office
~'
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5. The primary purpose and intent of the height
restrictions contained within the attached covenant is
to protect the view of the Salt Lake valley for those
lots in Plat "F" on the uphill side of property subject
to the restrictions. [Emphasis added.]
Whether or not a restrictive covenant applies to land is a matter
of intent on the part of the one who imposes the restrictions. I In this
case it is clear that when the restrictions were placed upon Plat F b
Mr. Cunningham, the president of Northcrest Investment Corporat'ion,
y
he did so to protect the view of owners on the uphill side of the land in
in that plat.
It is to be noticed that plaintiff does· not claim that defendants'
land is subjected to any restrictions otre r than those set out by Northcre;:
Investment Corporation as above set forth. There is no claim that any
prior restriction made by anyone other than Northcrest Investment, Inc.
confers any right upon the plaintiff to object to the manner in which the
defendants propose to build their home. At the time the restrictions wen
made to apply to "Northcrest Subdivision, Plat F" the Northcrest Invesli!
Corporation did not own any of the land in Plat E in which plaintiff's land;
located.
I concur in the holding that the plaintiff is not estopped from brin~
this suit because of any "collateral estoppel," but I dissent from theorde:
remanding the case for trial. There are no disputed is sues of fact show:
in this case and I think the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintillbai
no right to maintain the suit. I would affirm that ruling and award costs
to the respondent.

WILKINS, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the concurril;
in part and dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Ellett.

the annotationinS'·:
1. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants etc., Sec. 292 ; see
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